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Head shot of Patanjali Sokaris

Patanjali Sokaris

Pondering the universe

Accessing encrypted communications

The red herring in the security debate

There are two aspects that don't seem to part of the discussion aound law enforcement access to encrypted communications, but are both legitimate concerns.

One is trust, with citizens increasingly concerned that their governments themselves are the biggest threat actor. This is especially of concern given the hyper-politicisation of the supposed need for blanket vague security access. If people are more afraid of their government than criminals or even other state actors that means that there is a real trust issue.

After all, it was the revealing of pervasive and indiscriminate mass US government surveillance by Snowden that prompted a lot of tech companies to go for end-to-end encryption, and not really North Korea, Russia or Iran, whose attempts have been far more targeted.

The other issue is corruption, in the aspect of that it is weak points of certain people in the information access process that makes opening doors into encrypted information streams weak in a practical sense. That weakness can be bribes to individual police and telco employees, or revenge actions by those same people. Without technical access, these weaknesses are largely irrelevant, as end-to-end encryption completely thwarts such incidental human weak points.

The whole point of access to encrypted data is about being able to pre-emptively thwart possible criminal or terrorist action, as evidence of intent. However, without actually doing anything else that takes practical steps to make those threat actions a reality, they have done nothing more than chat about it.

Of course, paedophiles can send each other pictures and videos over encrypted channels, but they have to land unencrypted somewhere on peoples' computers, which is what is really need to convict. However, it is clear that such people have been shielded from access from the law by very powerful societal institutions, including the police and politicians themselves, and that has been shown to be far more pervasive, yet still more visible to those who wanted to actually see than their formerly open-channel communications. This is an excuse for pervasive surveillance than really trying to stop mass perversion.

Subsequent investigation of a lot terrorist actions, including 9/11, has been that general failure of law agencies to properly address obvious indications of the preliminary activities for those incidents. Having the extra information from encrypted channels is not going to help if obvious physical actions are being ignored.

Basically, this focussing on the technical aspect of getting access to information is misleading if there is such gross systemic failures to properly address handling the realities of the threats that are cited as the reasons for needing the access.

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